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In this article we interrogate the claim that there is an opioid crisis: a 
dramatic rise in drug overdose fatalities in the United States over the 
past two decades that is also spreading to other countries.  The usual 
argument is that this crisis is largely explained by errant prescription 
practices leading to an oversupply of opioids, leading to addiction, 
premature mortality and drug overdose deaths, both among those 
prescribed opioids for pain relief, and those obtaining them on the 
illegal market.  We argue, that this view is highly problematic and that 
it is likely to entrench deeper problems with how substance addiction 
has been perceived and known. In this article, we develop an 
alternative picture of the addiction crisis based on four years of 
research and collaboration with addiction neuroscientists. Drug 
overdose deaths, we claim, are symptoms of what we term the 
‘structural distribution of social despair.’ We argue that this is 
compounded by a translation crisis at the heart of addiction 
neuroscience. For all its dominance, the ‘dopamine hypothesis’ of 
addiction that shaped understandings for some three decades, has 
still not produced a single effective treatment. However, this 
translation crisis also represents an opportunity for ‘the memory turn’ 
in addiction neuroscience as it seeks to translate its emerging 
conception of addiction as a problem of memory into effective forms 
of treatment. We conclude by arguing that, for the ‘memory turn’ to 
underpin effective interventions into ‘the opioid crisis’, a new relation 
between neuroscientists and social scientists of addiction is needed, 
one that proceeds from the lived experience of human beings.
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Introduction: addiction neuroscience and the 
opioid crisis
               Drug addiction is a disorder of long-term memory
                     Eric Kandel, The Disordered Mind (2018)
In this article we review the claim that there is an addiction cri-
sis and argue that the crisis represents both a challenge and an 
opportunity for addiction neuroscience, as it seeks to translate 
its emerging conception of addiction as a problem of memory 
into effective forms of treatment. We argue that this requires 
a neurosocial approach inspired by social medicine; a new 
relation of ‘critical friendship, between neuroscientists and 
social scientists of addiction.
The crisis concerns the much-discussed rapid rises in drug 
overdose fatalities in the United States, which are fuelled by an 
opioid epidemic. This poses fundamental questions of knowl-
edge and translational research that are by no means specific to 
the United States, or even addiction. This crisis is, fundamen-
tally, one of translation. Most medical and psychiatric research 
on addiction since the 1970s has been informed by a neurosci-
entific theory of addiction as excessive pleasure seeking that 
is yet to produce a single effective treatment. We argue that this 
concept of addiction has not delivered on its promises, in large 
part because it does not accord with the human experience 
of drug dependence or addiction1. Further, much addiction 
neuroscience has depended on neurochemical models and phar-
macological interventions that are isolated from social condi-
tions of distress that so often condition lives marked by addiction. 
The translational crisis in addiction neuroscience thus has deeper 
epistemological roots in how human problems are perceived 
and known in our “neurobiological age” (Rose, 2013).
Despite the emergence of a science that claims addiction is 
not a matter of will or personality but has a biological basis in 
the brain, and despite decades of research into this neurobio-
logical basis of substance addiction, we do not seem to be able 
to convert this knowledge into treatment interventions. Thus, 
proposals to tackle the opioid crisis are dishearteningly famil-
iar. Reduce prescriptions of opioid based pain killers for pain 
so that they do not leak into the illegal market. Convert those 
who have become opioid users to alleviate chronic pain to 
non-pharmacological means of pain control - CBT, mindful-
ness, acupuncture. Try to mitigate the dangers of illegal use by 
harm reduction, moving those who have become dependent 
on opioids onto less addictive drugs such as buprenorphine. 
Educate prescribers, educate children, educate those experienc-
ing chronic pain, educate actual and potential addicts as to the 
dangers. And from the social scientists, the familiar critique of 
‘medicalisation’ and of the powers of big pharma to influ-
ence prescribing practices, as witnessed in the rise and rise of 
OxyContin.
The first half of this article defines the problem, the second 
documents a response to it from within parts of addiction 
neuroscience. Significant changes are taking place in addiction 
neuroscience that are not yet well-known within social studies 
of addiction. A new mode of thought has emerged over the 
last two decades that is changing how addiction neuroscience 
sees addiction. As Steve Hyman, then director of National 
Institute of Mental Health, said in 2005: “Based on the 
available neuroscientific evidence from the molecular to the 
behavioural, addiction is best explained as a disorder of memory 
and learning”. Drug memory science is starting to conceptual-
ise how brain and behaviour and pleasure and pain coexist in 
complex ways in memories that give rise to chronic relaps-
ing addiction. We suggest that this research may offer a way out 
of the translation crisis in part by creating new collaborations and 
knowledge-exchange between life and human sciences. Thera-
peutic hope is starting to be invested in this burgeoning field of 
enquiry. Drug memory science has begun the difficult transi-
tion from lab to clinic. And yet the most telling contribution of 
drug memory science might be to articulate – at the level of 
molecular and neural systems – why addiction is so resistant 
to treatments.
The argument advanced in this article is based upon four 
years of research and collaboration with addiction neuroscien-
tists (McLean, 2019). Integral to the method was the “history 
of concepts” (Foucault, 1966 [1991]). This is the study of how 
concepts emerge within a field of knowledge and how they 
reshape the ways that researchers within that field perceive 
and think about their object of enquiry. This research was 
underpinned by interviews and conversations with addiction 
neuroscientists and historians, and time spent in a leading neu-
roscience laboratory in the UK. The analysis was developed in a 
number of workshops organised by the Neuroscience and Soci-
ety Network (NSN) based at King’s College London. This is 
an interdisciplinary network which facilitates collaborations 
between researchers in the life sciences and the human sci-
ences in the spirit of ‘critical friendship (Rose & Abi-Rached, 
2013). Indeed, this article grows out of an international NSN 
workshop titled Memory/Habit/Addiction that took place in 
early 20202.
Drug overdose crisis
Disease concepts of human experience tend to have a bad repu-
tation in the social sciences and humanities. And for good 
reasons. Social conditions of distress, from socioeconomic 
deprivation to racism and social exclusion, are almost always 
1The terminology is contested (Hasin et al., 2013; O’Brien, 2011). We have, 
however, chosen to refer to ‘addiction’ rather than ‘dependence’. Dependence 
is a ‘normal’ adaptive response. Almost everyone who takes psychoactive 
substances for an extended period becomes dependent, and will experience 
unpleasant symptoms on withdrawal of the substance in question, but only 
a small percentage of people develop compulsive, chronic drug-seeking that 
characterize the clinical category of addiction. ‘Substance use disorder’ is the 
clinical name for drug addiction in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders IV, but the overall title is “Substance and Addiction-Related 
Disorders.” (APA, 2013).
2This proceedings of this Workshop are reported at http://somatosphere.
net/2020/memory-habit-addiction.html/
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reduced to matters of individual pathology. This has the effect 
of turning our critical attention away from the ways in which 
power and violence often operate through concepts of health 
and sickness. That neuroscientific research is often subject to the 
same kind of criticisms is unsurprising, since concepts of disease 
and illness are increasingly determined by how neurobiology 
perceives and knows them. Addiction is no different.
Despite many differences within addiction neuroscience, there 
are certain beliefs that the majority of addiction researchers 
can agree upon irrespective of discipline, method, or training. 
One is that some human beings develop relationships with 
drugs they wish to change, but have great difficulty doing so 
‘organically’ without specialist support. Another is that only a 
small proportion of drug users experience adverse life- 
changing problems due to drug use – support networks breaking 
down, jobs and homes being lost. Few researchers in the field 
would accept the stereotypical vision of the drug user as 
a person whose life has been emptied of meaning and value 
beyond finding the next ‘hit’ or ‘score’. Drug addiction is far less 
common than domestic drug policy in the United States or 
United Kingdom would suggest (Garriott, 2011; Nutt, 2012), or 
one would imagine based on news reporting. This is especially 
true in the case of ‘hard’ illegal drugs such as heroin, crack 
cocaine and methamphetamine (Reinarman & Levine, 1997). And 
yet when debate and theorising about the ‘causes’ of addiction 
cools down, we are still left with the reality. Human beings 
suffer from unattended misery they themselves attribute to drug 
use, and typically desire relief from their affliction. No cri-
tique of disease concepts, however justified or well-intentioned, 
changes this painful truth of social life today.
According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 
approximately 19.7 million people in the United States, aged 12 
and older, battled with “substance use disorder” in 2017 
(NSDUH, 2017). The National Institute on Drug Abuse 
(NIDA, 2018) describes drug addiction as a “national crisis” in 
the United States. The costs to health, society and economic wel-
fare, NIDA argues, are “devastating”. This crisis is represented 
most strikingly in drug-related mortality statistics over the past 
two decades. From 1999 to 2018, 817,000 people are estimated 
to have died from drug overdoses, making it a leading cause 
of injury-related death in the United States (Hedegaard et al., 
2020). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention situ-
ate the “opioid epidemic” at the heart of this crisis. In the same 
period of time, opioid-related overdose deaths – those including 
prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids like fentanyl 
– increased almost six times (Hedegaard et al., 2020).
In 2018, opioids were involved in 70% of all drug overdose 
deaths in the United States, with synthetic opioids (other than 
methadone) accounting for nearly two-thirds of these drug 
overdose deaths (Wilson et al., 2020). The total “economic 
burden” of prescription opioid misuse alone in the United 
States is estimated at $78.5 billion a year (CDC, 2016). Accord-
ing to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction, although the number of drug overdose deaths is far 
lower in the United Kingdom, similar trends appear to be devel-
oping (EMCDDA, 2017). In 2018, England and Wales recorded 
the highest number and the highest annual increase in drug 
overdose deaths since the time series began in 1993 (ONS, 
2019). Britain also leads Europe in drug overdose deaths: almost 
1 in 3 drug overdose deaths in Europe occurred in the UK 
in 2018 – twice the number of those occurring in Germany, 
which is in second place (EMCDDA, 2017).
A social autopsy of drug overdose deaths
Framing the opioid crisis as a “crisis of over prescription” (Nutt, 
2012) comes with the danger of inflicting social wounds rather 
than healing them. Doing so turns critical attention away from 
the profound social distress at the root of drug overdose deaths. 
First, it is important to recognise that these deaths are not 
specific to opioids3, and while the over prescription of 
OxyContin and other opioids clearly require urgent redress, 
we argue that they are symptoms of what we might term ‘the 
structural distribution of social despair’.
This is a conclusion reached by American economists, Anne 
Case and Angus Deaton in their new book, Deaths of Despair 
and the Future of Capitalism (2020). Uniquely among high-
income nations, life-expectancy in the United States has declined 
for three consecutive years, for the first time since 1918, which 
they explain through the dramatic rise of “deaths of despair” 
as a result of drug overdose, suicide and alcoholism over the 
past two decades. Case and Deaton draw conclusions that recall 
those of Durkheim (1897|2002) in his classic sociological study 
of suicide at the end of the 19th century. The oversupply of opi-
oids, they argue, did not create the conditions for this despair, 
they filled the gaping hole opened up in white working-class 
communities by four decades of social and economic exclusion 
and fragmentation. For those without a college education, not 
only have median wages declined since 1979, and work secu-
rity deteriorated, they have found themselves less valued in the 
economy and disconnected from the ‘American Dream’. Drug 
overdose deaths, like suicide and self-harm, they propose, 
follow from a loss of belonging, of self-worth and of hope 
amidst social and economic upheaval.
Framing drug overdoses as “deaths of despair” is gaining trac-
tion. For all the talk of ‘accidental overdose’ from prescription 
opioids, the relationship between suicide and opioid use is 
emerging as a significant area of research (Oquendo & Volkow, 
2018). Early signs indicate that they are “entangled in multiple 
ways” (Volkow & Gordon, 2019). A 2017 study based on national 
survey data found two things of particular importance: that 
suicidal ideation was 40-60% higher for people who misused 
prescription opioids than those who do not; and that individu-
als with a prescription opioid use disorder were twice as likely 
3From 2012 through 2018, drug overdose deaths involving cocaine more 
than tripled. In 2017, cocaine accounted for nearly 1 in 5 overdose deaths. 
And between 2017 and 2018, there was a thirty-seven per cent increase in 
overdoses involving psychostimulants such as methamphetamine.
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to attempt suicide as those who did not misuse prescription 
opioids (Ashrafioun et al., 2017).
Isolating the opioid crisis from the wider problem of drug 
overdose and prescription opioids from illegal drugs not only 
diverts critical attention away from profound social distress, 
it threatens to deepen social division by stratifying drug users 
into two broad groups based, it seems, more on prejudice and 
discrimination than knowledge and evidence. On the one hand, 
there are ‘bad addicts’ mixed up with illegal opioids, to be 
punished with the full force of the law. And on the other hand, 
‘unfortunate dependents’ deserving of social and medical 
support having become unwillingly dependent upon legal opio-
ids. This division has the potential to exacerbate hostile public 
attitudes towards drugs and those who use them, and to entrench 
stigma that remains a major barrier preventing people from 
seeking out and receiving support and treatment for drug-
related life-problems (Hadland et al., 2018; Lloyd, 2010; Yang, 
et al., 2017). It could even fuel already tense racial divisions. 
Note, as Chris McGreal does in American Overdose (2019), how 
the first group is typically associated in the public imagina-
tion with African American and Hispanics, and the second group 
with Whites.
This should not surprise anyone. For dividing opioid users 
into deserving and undeserving groups helped to create the 
conditions for a never-ending ‘war of drugs’ that has always 
had an ugly racial dimension. As David Courtwright (1982: 1) 
demonstrates in his history of opioid addiction in America, our 
modern medical concept of addiction emerged in the United 
States between 1865 and 1935 out of a fundamental change in 
medical perceptions of the ‘typical addict’. In this period the 
“addict profile” shifted from the “addicted matron”, middle- 
aged women of the middle or upper class, to the “street crimi-
nal”, lower-class urban men perceived to be African American or 
Hispanic. Indeed, we might ask if the opioid crisis would be 
viewed as an urgent public health problem by political and medi-
cal elites if problems with Fentanyl and OxyContin addiction 
were entangled in the public imagination with the lives of 
African American men in Harlem or Detroit.
Rise and fall of the dopamine hypothesis
Lifting the opioid crisis out of this social and historical context 
makes it more difficult to understand. Important determining 
forces are hidden from view, or at the very least, more difficult 
to perceive. In contradistinction to the reductionism that governs 
so much of addiction medicine, we argue that the more restricted 
our perception of a complex phenomenon such as the opioid 
crisis is, the more limited is the collective capacity of soci-
ety and addiction research to know and to manage the harms 
associated with long-term substance addiction.
The dangers of viewing errant prescription practices as the ‘cause’ 
of the opioid crisis, and this crisis as distinct from the social 
pathology expressed through drug overdose deaths and suicides 
are compounded, we argue, by the way substance addiction 
has come to be seen and known by medical, political and legal 
institutions in the United States over the three acts of the opioid 
tragedy. First heroin, then prescription opioids, then synthetics. 
A way of seeing and knowing addiction in which social 
conditions of distress and lived human experience are subtracted 
from its conception of addiction.
The diagnosis of an ‘opioid crisis’ takes for granted an impor-
tant assumption. That addiction is a neuropsychiatric condition 
and this condition the underlying cause of the tragedy. And 
behind the clinical classification of addiction stands a neurosci-
entific theory, one promoted by the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse (NIDA) over the past three decades (Campbell, 2007; 
Courtwright, 2019; Raikhel, 2017; Vrecko, 2010). This is what 
the historian David Courtwright (2010: 137), writing a decade 
ago, termed the “NIDA paradigm”. It stands, he writes, for 
the theory that addiction is a “chronic, relapsing brain disease 
characterised by a loss of control over drug-taking”. Accord-
ing to this theory, it is high volumes of dopamine (the so-called 
‘pleasure molecule’) in the brain’s ‘reward system’ that underlie 
the loss of self-control said to define addiction. For this reason, 
neuroscientists sometimes refer to it as the “dopamine theory” 
of addiction, or the “dopamine hypothesis” (Marsden, 2006; 
Nutt et al., 2015; Robbins & Everitt, 1999; Wise & Rompre, 1989; 
Wise, 2018).
In their major review of the “rise and fall of dopamine the-
ory”, Nutt et al. (2015) sharpen the focus of this claim, and 
in so doing elucidate its most important implication. The 
humbling truth, they conclude, is that the dopamine-based neu-
roscience of addiction is yet to produce a “single effective 
treatment” for addiction. If there is indeed such a translation 
crisis - a crisis of turning knowledge into treatments able to amel-
iorate the suffering experienced by the 8-12% of opioid users 
who develop opioid addiction – then perhaps is not merely 
because translation is difficult, but because the dopamine 
hypothesis itself fails to grasp the biological or social nature of 
addiction.
Translation crisis
The translation crisis addiction neuroscience has struggled 
to address reflects, we argue, a fundamental conceptual and 
experimental weakness at the heart of dopamine theory. It is 
governed by a neurobiological concept of addiction as excessive 
pleasure-seeking and an over-emphasis on the mesolimbic 
dopamine pathway at odds with the human experience of addic-
tion, as it is documented in authoritative clinical, neuroscientific, 
and social studies (Bourgois, 2000; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; 
Everitt, 2014; Marsden et al., 2018; Volkow et al., 2016). This 
is particularly true with human opioid addiction. Two brief 
examples, one neurobiological, the other anthropological, make 
this point for us.
First: neurobiology. The pleasure-seeking concept is at odds 
with both George Koob’s (2008, with Le Moal, 2008) influen-
tial work on stress and the dysregulation of affect, and basic 
knowledge of the neurochemical function of opioid receptors, first 
demonstrated by Candice Pert & Solomon Snyder (1973). That 
opioids function in the nervous system of the body or in spe-
cific brain receptors to reduce the intensity of pain. It is also 
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radically at odds with the lived experience of heroin addiction. 
Second: anthropology. In Pastoral Clinic (2010: 5), an affect-
ing ethnography of heroin addiction in New Mexico’s Española 
Valley, “home to the highest rate of heroin addiction and fatal 
overdoses in the United States”, Angela Garcia documents in 
elegiac detail, the motivating power of suffering in human addic-
tion, and the complex ways grief and pain become entwined 
with memories of pleasure and the uncertain promises they 
make. The promise not of happiness, nor even satisfaction, but 
at best, temporal relief from life’s misery.
And yet dopamine theory has proven highly influential in shap-
ing perceptions of addiction neuroscience in the social sciences 
(Courtwright, 2019). It is how, with few exceptions, social 
scientists conceive of addiction neuroscience. Indeed, the terms 
‘NIDA paradigm’ and ‘brain disease model’ are used inter-
changeably, as if the National Institute on Drug Abuse represents 
the field and defines how it perceives and thinks about addic-
tion. There is no doubting the political and economic power 
of NIDA. But it is a mistake to think this power has translated 
into epistemic consensus – a shared unified way of seeing and 
knowing addiction. For there are not only multiple neuroscientific 
theories of addiction (Campbell, 2011; Raikhel, 2015), there are 
several competing dopamine models with different concepts of 
dopamine function. Most notably, perhaps, Wolfgang Schultz’s 
(2007a, 2007b, 2011) influential work on “prediction error” 
in the striatum, amygdala and frontal cortex, which accounts 
for the difference between an “expected reward” based on prior 
experience (and thus memory of it) and the “actual reward” 
provided by the drug or behaviour. But more significantly, as 
we shall see, is that the memory concept of addiction is now 
at the heart of mainstream addiction neuroscience. In the 
words of the Director of the National Institute for Alcohol 
Abuse, George Koob et al. (2017): “The overall hypothesis that 
addiction persists as a memory or memory-like process long 
after drug exposure has become the widely accepted position 
in the field.”
Beyond the pleasure principle
As the dopamine hypothesis begins to mutate, it is worth 
asking why it its epistemic authority was so long-lasting, 
despite its explanatory and translational failures? Perhaps this is 
because it linked so well with more general arguments in the 
neuroscience of psychopathologies that focussed so much 
attention on the functioning of individual neurotransmitters 
often seamlessly moving from the experimental reductionism of 
laboratory based research on animal models to a kind of meta-
physical reductionism that extrapolates, without intermediate 
experimental work, to the vital lives of human beings, whose 
brains are not only many orders of magnitude greater, whose 
neural development is not only many orders of time longer, and 
whose environmental transactions are not only immensely more 
rich and complex, but whose lives are unintelligible without 
recognising that the world they inhabit is one of meanings and 
memories, shaped by myths and stories of lives, their own and 
others, of hopes and aspirations, of dreams and despair. Perhaps 
it is also because the dopamine hypothesis retained resonances 
of the moralistic image of the insatiable quest for the pleasure 
of the hit overwhelming the will, conscience and the demands 
of propriety and civility: the science of addiction here retained 
the sense that what was at stake was a disease of the will 
(Valverde, 2008).
What, then accounts for the waning of its epistemic authority? 
No doubt many factors have been involved, as they always 
are in the overturning of a paradigm, or the mutation in a 
style of thought. Anomalies certainly accumulated, as we 
would expect from a reading of Kuhn (1970), and a younger 
group of research scientists, if not revolutionaries, certainly 
sought to mutate the old ways of thinking into something new. But 
not least among the factors that led to the waning of the 
dopamine hypothesis, we suggest, is its inability to translate, to 
generate anything significant that could actually intervene posi-
tively in the lives of those who it branded as addicts, or as 
those suffering from a substance addiction.
Let us be clear. We are in no way implying the ‘dopamine 
theory’ and its influence could explain the translation gap. No 
theory, however influential or sophisticated, could account for 
the history of social distress underlying the opioid crisis. We 
are, however, arguing that ‘dopamine theory’ has significant 
weaknesses, which have held addiction research back. The 
theory is reductive in two vital and related ways. First, its pleas-
ure-seeking concept is at odds with the lived experience of 
human addiction. Second, it deals with neurobiological 
mechanisms as if they function in isolation from the ‘social’. 
There is, however, one neuroscientific theory of addiction in par-
ticular that is changing the direction of addiction neuroscience 
– ‘the memory turn’. This is a new way of seeing and knowing 
substance addiction that helps to address these weaknesses 
with ‘dopamine theory’. In the remainder of this paper we will 
sketch out what this new mode of enquiry is, how it may 
overcome limitations of the ‘dopamine hypothesis’, and why 
we think it opens up new possibilities for thinking about and 
perhaps tackling the translation gap that the opioid crisis has 
brought into sharp relief.
The memory turn
By the mid-1990s, neuroscientists and psychologists were already 
arguing that neurochemical models of dopamine are unable 
to explain vital neurobiological and psychological features of 
addiction (Hyman, 2005; Robinson & Berridge, 1998; Robinson 
& Berridge, 1993; Robbins & Everitt, 2016; White, 1996). 
Two features in particular posed problems for this model. First, 
that compulsive drug-seeking persists despite the known harms 
to health and risk to life. And second, and perhaps most impor-
tant, that drug-related compulsions and cravings that result in 
relapses can persist for years even decades after all detectable 
traces of neurochemicals have left the body.
Around the same time, addiction and memory scientists 
started to converge on a shared realisation. That addiction and 
long-term memory share molecular, neural and cellular pathways 
and systems (Hyman et al., 2006; Kelley, 2004). To understand 
one, is to know the other. And that this intimate relationship 
between chronic, relapsing addiction on the one side, and long-term 
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memory on the other, may provide a basis for exploring and 
making sense of those vital features of substance addiction 
(Nestler, 2001; Nestler, 2013; Nestler et al., 1992; Robbins et al., 
2008).
This insight formed the basis for of a new field of knowledge – 
drug memory science – that is organised around three distinct if 
mutually reinforcing lines of enquiry. The first is neurobehav-
ioral studies of conditioned learning that explain how habitual 
opioid use turns into addiction over time (Everitt & Robbins, 
2015; Robbins et al., 2001). The second is the analysis of how 
memories associated with drugs – including opioids - underpin 
compulsive ideation and behaviour and weaken the capacity 
to acquire new habits (Milton & Everitt, 2010). The third is 
research on the ways that substance addiction damages the fun-
damental neurobiological mechanisms involved in long-term 
memory (Kalivas & O’Brien, 2007; Kauer & Malenka, 2006; 
Lüscher & Malenka, 2011).
Drug memory science seeks to understand the neurocognitive 
systems and molecular processes underlying drug memories 
as well as the memories themselves. Drug memories can be 
“declarative” – those we can consciously recall. But for the most 
part, they are “procedural”; unconscious and automatic memo-
ries that are primary when it comes to addiction (Squire, 2004). 
Declarative memories function by strengthening existing asso-
ciations between drugs and environmental and physiological 
cues. Drug memories are “maladaptive” (Milton & Everitt, 2012) 
because they are strongly affective and extremely difficult to 
disrupt and change once “consolidated” the first time (Tronson 
& Taylor, 2013). Functional, perhaps even structural, changes to 
memory systems in the brain underlie aberrant drug memories 
and pathological learning” (Everitt, 2018; Robbins & Ersche, 2008; 
Robbins & Everitt, 2001).
To make sense of this process, neural, molecular and 
behavioural knowledge of the “mesolimbic dopamine system” (the 
pathway connecting the ventral tegmental area in the midbrain 
to the ventral striatum of the basal ganglia in the forebrain) has 
been integrated into new knowledge in our understanding of 
“corticostriatal systems” that connect the striatum to the 
prefrontal cortex (Graybiel, 2008; Graybiel & Grafton, 2015). 
This neurobiology of habit gives a new sense to the long-
standing description of drug addiction as a ‘habit’. As Barry 
Everitt & Trevor Robbins (1999) put it: “Bad habits add up.”
From bench to clinic
Drug memory science is also starting to inform the clinical clas-
sification of addiction. The latest edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5, 2013) included 
“powerful memories” as part of the core symptomatology 
of “substance use disorder” for the first-time5. The memory 
turn has also started to make the difficult transition from animal 
models to clinical human research. So far, clinical research 
that is informed by the memory concept of addiction is largely 
focused on pharmacological interventions. In particular, the dis-
covery of chemical “agonists” or “antagonists” to disrupt drug 
memories, either by introducing states of “reconsolidation” 
so they can be modified, or “extinction” to break altogether 
conditioned reactions to cues. (Lee et al., 2005; Merlo et al., 
2014; Miller & Marshall, 2005; Torregrossa & Taylor, 2012). 
This is much like the betablocker propranolol was found to 
disrupt “fear memories” in posttraumatic stress disorder through 
a process of reconsolidation (Debiec et al., 2006; Nader et al., 
2000). 
The rise and fall of dopamine theory show that unless drug 
memory science can make the transition from knowledge to life, 
the memory turn will be unable to reduce the translation gap. 
This requires treating not only chemical dependence, but the 
long-lasting effects addiction has on cognition and behaviour. 
There are some positive developments in this direction. One 
memory-focused human model is the clinical work of Professor 
John Marsden and colleagues at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psy-
chology and Neuroscience (IoPPN) at King’s College London 
on cocaine use disorder (CUD) (2018). They have devel-
oped and piloted a novel Memory-focused Cognitive Therapy 
(MFCT) to tackle CUD. Given the enduring effects of cocaine-
related conditioning in patients, cue-induction procedures are 
used to elicit cocaine-related cognitions in patients, with the 
aim of reducing craving for the stimulant.
Through repeated cue-exposure that goes unrewarded, the strong 
associations between stimulant-cues-responses established in 
addiction are broken over time. MFCT also adapts trauma-focused 
cognitive therapy successfully developed for post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) to reduce the intensity of affective responses 
to trauma-related memories. Crucially, MCFT uses a range 
of techniques to restructure how patients think about, perceive 
and relate to the stimulant and its sensory associations. That is 
to say, to help them grasp the situational dependence of their hab-
its and avoid or reframe those situations that evoke the habitual 
craving for the substance. In an important way, patients become 
necessary collaborators in the process of discovering and 
reducing the social and affective cues that maintain the 
compulsive use of drugs long after the initial goal has dissipated. 
Closing the gap
The memory turn, we are arguing, is an important event in 
addiction neuroscience. It has given birth to a new way of see-
ing and knowing substance addiction as a memory disorder. That 
is to say, an inability to forget drug memories and to learn 
new habits due to the pathological usurpation of memory sys-
tems and processes. But how does the memory theory of 
addiction advance knowledge of the drug overdose crisis? 
How does it overcome the conceptual and practical limits of 
‘dopamine theory’? And how might it offer a way out of the 
translation problem?
The memory turn focusses upon explaining how opioid use 
becomes habitual, dependence develops and in turn how 
this turn into compulsive, chronic relapsing behaviors that char-
acterise substance addiction. While the ‘dopamine theory’ is 
certainly effective in explaining some of the important 
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neurochemical adaptations in the ‘reward system’, the mem-
ory turn is thus much better suited to interrogating the more 
destructive cases of substance addiction that represent the opi-
oid crisis. It is more attuned to the lived experience of human 
addiction as shown in social and clinical studies referred to 
above. It taps into the complex nature of motivation in which 
pleasure and pain coexist in drug memory. It is not simply that the 
person wishes to ‘feel good’, or to be ‘free of pain’, it is that 
pleasure and pain become entwined in reinforcing ways. And 
it does so, by situating the neural, cognitive and affective sys-
tems involved within a neuropsychological schema in which the 
‘social’ plays a decisive role.
The compulsive, chronic, relapsing hallmarks of substance 
addiction can be explained through neurochemical maladap-
tations alone. These behaviors are in part the product of an 
extraordinary range of unconscious and conscious associations 
established between drugs and cues in the lived environment 
that changes in drug memory help to explain. That is to say the 
ways in which these drug-related associations, the lives people 
live, and the meanings given to experience are represented in 
drug memories and memory systems. We call these interac-
tions of brain and life ‘neurosocial relations’. These relations 
represent a challenge for addiction research: the need to 
develop conceptual and experimental models of the ways that 
unconscious and conscious processes interact through memory to 
undermine human efforts to develop new relationships (cognitive 
and affective) with drugs.
A recognition of the need to understand these neurosocial 
relations can underpin a new way forward in addressing the 
translation crisis. It can open up a creative space for collabora-
tions between social scientists and neuroscientists, a space that 
the Neuroscience and Society Network has been cultivating. 
A space in which the hard work of developing these models 
can take place. Going forward, we argue, these neurosocial 
collaborations are essential. No one, certainly not the neurosci-
entists involved, thinks the memory turn alone could possibly 
address the opioid crisis. This will require not only the full par-
ticipation of the academic research community; it will depend 
upon having service users at the heart of these collaborations.
But we should be realistic. Perhaps the major therapeutic 
insight of the memory turn is to demonstrate the social under-
pinnings, both in social suffering and in situational memories, 
that make substance addiction so difficult to overcome. The 
neurosocial collaborations necessary to advance this way 
of thinking will take time to develop, and even longer to 
develop workable responses to substance addiction. In a politi-
cal context dominated by the never-ending ‘war of drugs’ in 
which abstinence in the form of ‘drug recovery’ prevails, harm 
reduction activism (see Campbell, 2020) that is led by service 
users, but supported by neurosocial collaborations, would be 
a positive move forward. This approach will not ‘cure’ society 
of substance addiction – nothing will. Nor will it close the 
translation gap once and for all. But a renewed commitment to 
evidence-based harm reduction would save lives and reduce 
misery, and that at least, would be no small thing.
Conclusion: Vital life
Drug memory science taps into an existential truth of memory 
(see Heidegger, 1978 [1927]; Nietzsche, 1974[1885]) that the 
human experience of chronic, relapsing addiction discloses. 
That memories hold us together, but they can also tear us apart – 
from ourselves, others, and life itself. Such is the paradox of 
memory.
Twenty-five years ago, memory was a marginal object of 
enquiry in addiction neuroscience. While drug memory science 
has multiple starting points, the first attempt to conceptualize 
substance addition in terms of ‘multiple memory systems’ can 
probable be dated to a paper by White (1996), a neuropsy-
chologist based at McGill. Two decades later, the memory 
concept of addiction has become central to neuroscientific 
thought. Eric Kandel, the most prominent neurobiologist of 
memory of his generation, has no doubt. In his recent book, The 
Disordered Mind, he writes “Drug addiction is a problem of 
long-term memory”. “The memory of pleasure” he continues, 
“persists long after an addicted person has stopped taking the 
drug” (Kandel, 2018: 201-2).
As Kandel’s quote shows, addiction neuroscience is not post- 
pleasure. The memory turn does not represent a straightforward 
shift from pleasure to memory. It does, however, contradict the 
Utilitarian concept of pleasure-seeking inherent in dopamine 
theory of addiction. The human experience of addiction studied 
by sociologists and anthropologists such as Angela Garcia 
call into question Bentham’s (2015[1789]) famous dictum that 
pleasure and pain constitute the two “sovereign masters” of 
human nature and motivation. The memory turn shows rather 
that the pleasure of addiction coexists with pain and suffering in 
memories of drug-related experience. Drug memories which 
appear to strengthen and become more sensitive to being ‘trig-
gered’ by the associations that build up between drugs and 
cues over time.
New collaborations between life and human sciences are 
needed to address the translation weakness in addiction studies. 
Collaborations forged with the purpose of attending to the afflic-
tion of addiction – not the interests or epistemic authority 
of any one field of knowledge. On this, Nietzsche (1997[1887]) 
was right – ‘objective’ knowledge means seeing with many 
eyes. The memory concept of addiction, we argue, makes drug 
memory science a good candidate for cultivating these 
collaborations and models. In part because the relations of brain- 
life and pleasure-suffering are built into the concept itself in 
ways social scientists and humanities can help develop. If the 
memory turn is to aid addiction studies in fulfilling this 
ambition, neurosocial collaborations must develop new models 
of experimental research that have social life at their heart. 
Such neurosocial collaborations sustained by “critical friendship” 
(Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013), must proceed from the vital life 
of human beings.
Data availability
All data underlying the results are available as part of the article 
and no additional source data are required.
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The concept of addiction has never been a single universally accepted one, and various 
complementary or competing concepts – moral, medical, psychological, social and others - have 
coexisted over past decades or even centuries. From the mid-twentieth century to the 1970s, the 
various definitions adopted by the Expert Committee of the WHO were essentially 
pharmacological in nature, attributing addiction primarily to the actions of the drugs themselves 
and to individual differences in susceptibility to those actions (Jaffe, 1980; World Health 
Organization, 1974)1,2. In this generally well written and extensively documented conceptual 
analysis, McLean and Rose raise some important questions about the recent evolution of the 
concept.  
 
As they point out, the pharmacological concept of addiction was made more specific from the 
1970s onward by the neurobiological focus on addiction as pleasure-seeking based on the effects 
of drugs on a postulated dopaminergic reward system (Wise, 1980)3 and its offspring, the brain 
disease concept of addiction (Leshner, 1997)4. They criticise this focus on the grounds that (i) it is 
not in accord with the lived experience that distress rather than pleasure predominates in 
addicted drug use, (ii) the current epidemic of drug overdose deaths can not be attributed to 
overprescribing alone because suicidal thinking and attempts are common in overdose cases, (iii) 
it leads to differentiation between “good” addicts who are the victims of overprescribing and “bad” 
addicts who seek pleasure from illicit drugs, and (iv) the dopamine hypothesis has not led to any 
effective new therapy for addiction. They then argue that a much better explanation of addiction is 
provided by the theory evolved over the last twenty-five years that it is a functional disorder of 
long-term memory. This model, they believe, is already providing new and more effective 
approaches to treatment of addiction.  
 
The first two of these points are valuable corrections to commonly held but perhaps erroneous 
beliefs. The authors present abundant evidence to support them, and readers must give them 
serious consideration. However, the evidence provided does not make clear whether suicidal 
thinking preceded the start of addicted use, or was a consequence of it. The authors might wish to 
clarify that question, since it affects the strength of their argument. The third point is less 
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convincing, because the differentiation between those who actively seek and use illicit drugs and 
those who use drugs medically prescribed for them rests on a variety of social and psychological 
criteria, stereotypes and attitudes, and can not be attributed exclusively to the dopamine theory 
or other neurobiological models. The fourth point is perhaps debatable. While some reviewers 
conclude that drug therapy has been of little value in the treatment of addictions (Kalant, 2015)5, 
others consider it of significant clinical value (Pierce et al., 2012; Schacht et al., 2017)6,7. The 
present authors should consider making their comments on this point less absolute.  
 
The remainder of the paper, dealing with the importance of memory in the development of 
addiction, is probably the most important part. This is an older concept than the authors imply: 
the existence of links between learning and memory on the one hand and various elements of the 
clinical state of addiction on the other, had already been demonstrated well before the 1990s 
(Finkelberg et al., 1978; Kalant et al., 1971; Lê et al., 1982; van Wimersma-Greidanus et al., 1975)8-11
. Nevertheless, there is great value in this part of the paper, with its detailed and lucid explanation 
of the role of memory in the generation of addiction, and the extensive documentation of the 
more recent supporting evidence. Since this is a conceptual review rather than an experimental 
paper, I do not know how to answer the questions about study design, methods and analysis. 
Assuming that analysis refers to conceptual analysis rather than to analytical techniques, my 
answers to question 2 would be "Partly" and to question 3 "Yes". A similar recent review that 
examines addiction as a maladaptive form of learning draws on much of the same source 
literature (Lewis, 2018)12 and should be cited.  
 
The main limitation of this portion of the present paper is the tendency to view the memory theory 
of addiction and the neurobiologically based concepts as mutually exclusive, rather than to 
consider the possibility of complementary causal roles of both factors. As expressed elsewhere 
(Kalant, 2010, 2015)13,5, in most cases the neurobiological studies identify the mechanisms of 
brain responses while the behavioral and environmental studies explore the causes that call the 
mechanisms into play and direct them towards specific targets. However, the prolonged intake of 
large amounts of drugs of various kinds does lead to functional and even structural changes in the 
brain that can affect the severity of addiction and its susceptibility to treatment and the risk of 
relapse. For example, a recent review describes evidence that heavy consumption of ethanol, 
nicotine and other drugs of addiction can give rise to neuroinflammation and oxidative stress in 
the brain, which induce increased consumption, thus setting up a self-perpetuating cycle (Berríos-
Cárcamo et al., 2020)14 that can be stopped by administration of anti-inflammatory and 
antioxidant medications (Israel et al., 2019)15. McLean and Rose would improve the value of their 
review substantially if they could discuss the issue of neurobiological and behavioral mechanisms 
as interacting determinants of addiction rather than as conflicting and mutually exclusive 
explanations.  
 
A few minor corrections should be made if the paper is revised:
Page 7, right hand column, paragraph 3, line 6 – MCFT should be MFCT. 
 
○
Bottom paragraph, line 3 - “this turn” should be “this turns”. 
 
○




Page 8, paragraph 4, line 8 - “war of drugs” should be “war on drugs”. ○
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Final paragraph, line 1 - “collaborations between life and human sciences” is inappropriate, 
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This article identifies the shift in neuroscience from a reductionist dopamine model to memory 
pathways as a potentially paradigm-breaking moment that opens possibilities for a new 
interdisciplinary dialogue between neuroscientists and social scientists to make a call for the 
translational utility of what it calls “a neurosocial approach inspired by social medicine”. It 
tantalizingly holds up the laudable principle of a “…a new relation of ‘critical friendship, between 
neuroscientists and social scientists of addiction.” The prominence of the senior author and the 
Wellcome Institute venue and his thesis on the discursive power of neuroscience all through 
society but especially in disease would be a useful one for drawing greater attention to the 
potential of this dialogue. The emerging neurosocial literatures (not all of which would use that 
term but all claim to represent “the social” is simply ignored - when it is not ridiculed - by most US 
social scientists (who ignore laboratory science literatures), front-line harm reductionists, and 
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epidemiologists working on substance use disorders and/or addiction/treatment/outreach/social 
services. 
  
The “crisis” title and first half of the abstract is something of a red herring. As is the valence of the 
term “pursuit of pleasure” and the dismissive critiques of existing attempts at translational to 
effective treatments whether in mainstream medicine or harm reduction services. Those 
oversimplifications and inordinate valences to discursive power distract from the valuable 
important (utopian?) primary contribution of the article concerning the potential for the 
neurosocial dialogue: 
  
1) Crisis “hook” 
  
The article does not provide an argument that there is no "crisis," as commonly understood, 
namely a distinct rise in the numbers of opioid death in a defined span of time. On page 4, indeed 
the authors detail the rapid increase in opioid deaths that begs for response. They are right to 
emphasize that the increase in mortality is not well described as a simple technical “crisis of over 
prescription”. There is however a question with respect to: a) what kind of crisis is this, and b) 
whether or not "crisis language" is counterproductive and distracts from the root causes of the 
social/existential roots of the problem. Critiques of “the crisis model” (Roitman et al.) argue that 
“crisis” misconstrues long-standing and socially structurally embedded conditions that are not well 
described in the sudden language of “emergency” that produces short term palliative measures 
that are ultimately ineffective. (There is also the more old fashioned longstanding sociology of 
substance use disorder literature critiquing the stigmatizing/criminalizing effects of “moral 
panics”.) 
  
2) Overprescription and the novelty of “structural distribution of despair” 
  
The hegemonic model of addiction in the social sciences has already been for some decades a 
model of the “structural distribution of social despair” long before Case and Deaton’s valuable 
initial demographic documentation of the drop in life expectancy among least “educated” whites 
in 2015 (that appears to have been what prompted Deaton’s Nobel prize that same year). Few if 
any social scientists studying the lived experience of substance use disorders would ascribe the 
disaster of opioid deaths to something as naïvely technical and reductionist as “over prescription.“ 
The critical ethnographic literature goes back at least to the 1930s in the US. 
  
3) Do neuroscience models have significant impact on stigma and translational science vs old 
fashioned racism, class power and big pharma profiteering driving translational applications (in 
the US dominated globalized/medicalized and even the spiritual-religious field) if (in)effective 
“evidence based” treatments. 
  
I could not help wondering why shifting from addiction being a “brain disease” or “disease of the 
will” to a model emphasizing “damages” within “the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms 
involved in long-term memory” would be likely to be less likely to be translationally interpreted 
into “effective treatments” that are less stigmatizing in racist and/or xenophobic, in highly unequal 
societies where rapidly rising social inequality has been perversely normalized in popular 
consciousness (especially the US) as “good for the economy” and the only way to motivate human 
autonomy and self-realization? 
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4) Impact of "brain disease pursuit of pleasure” model in the social sciences. 
  
The NIDA paradigm is not the paradigm of most ethnographers and/or critical theory social 
scientists of addiction. Most have never viewed or have critiqued reductionist interpretations of 
“addiction is a disease/brain disease” model with a narrow definition of pleasure (or don’t even 
know what that refers to). Many if not most social scientists (who are not psychologists/health 
services behavioral scientists since at least the 1930s) have treated it as a social and political crisis. 
Focusing on “pleasure” as a strawman for memory also seems misplaced a false binary. Memory 
of pleasure is part of the memory prompt which few would reduce to a simple positive bounded 
definition of pleasure but commonsensically/psychologically/biologically socially might involve 
relief from pain or flight from suffering distress and traumatic memories. Incidentally the 
increasingly translational literature on “structural vulnerability” that is going more mainstream 
into left-leaning reinventions of medical education and clinical practice and addressing so-called 
“social determinants of health” can be of some use here as it applies to “addiction”. 
  
5) Translational failure of “Effective Treatments” 
  
 The trouble with the translational field of treatment (both the neuroscientific and the social 
quantitative and the social epidemiological) is that in medicalized and non-medicalized addiction 
treatment fields nothing and almost everything counts as evidence-based treatment from 
methadone/buprenorphine/naloxone to faith and conversion to CBT psychological therapy to 
narcotics anonymous to harm reduction. This is because, as the authors argue, addiction is a 
profoundly social phenomenon of personal existential suffering and population-level despair that 
is driven by forces and institutional structures. Consequently dismissing the NIDA brain disease 
pleasure or memory models for that matter which arguably produced or shaped or coincided 
with/influenced/legitimized biomedical/pharma driven methadone/buprenorphine naloxone 
treatments and even free spiritual narcotics anonymous treatments. Furthermore the clinicians 
and medicalized harm reductionists the neurosocial would want to reach out to refer to those as 
“evidence-based treatments”. Most importantly dismissing them is not consistent with the humility 
of anticipating that the neurosocial to advance translational effective treatments is to show how 
resistant to treatment addiction has been. I agree with their take on it overall but it is problematic 
in their presentation of it. 
  
In conclusion, and sorry for the length of this review. I enjoyed reading the article and I appreciate 
the authors’ optimism over the potential of a neurosocial dialogue and am intrigued and hopeful 
that the memory turn could possible open up a greater possibility for critically respectful dialogue 
across the current epistemological/interdisciplinary/disciplinary vacuums that lie between 
laboratory sciences and in vivo (one currently exists with more bio-psychologically reductionist and 
narrowly medicalized social sciences that has not been effective). I am not as optimistic as the 
authors and would like a bit more clarity/detail on how the memory turn will not encounter the 
same structural reductionist failures of the dopamine/pleasure model and ultimately (in the US at 
least) are likely to continue to be trumped (ugh) by moralizing populist conceptions of 
sin/worthiness/racism/carceral punishment/profiteering and genetic/biological reductionism.
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I am sympathetic to several of the themes that run through this paper, particularly the emphasis 
on “deaths of despair” as determinants of the opioid crisis, and the call for collaboration between 
neuroscientists and social scientists. I also appreciated the attempt to raise awareness among 
social scientists of the limitations of relatively simplistic neuroscientific accounts of addiction, and 
of the limited innovations in addiction treatment that have arisen from dopamine theory. 
  
However, I felt that the linkage between different arguments was unclear or overly speculative (or 
both), and in particular I was not persuaded by the authors’ argument that recent work on the 
‘memory turn’ is likely to yield a solution to the opioid crisis. I elaborate on these arguments 
below. 
  
1. The authors provide a brief accessible summary of the “rise and fall of the dopamine 
 
Page 17 of 20
Wellcome Open Research 2020, 5:215 Last updated: 15 OCT 2020
hypothesis” (p5). However, contemporary addiction neuroscientists are fully aware that the 
neurobiology of addiction is complicated, and goes well beyond dopaminergic adaptations. 
Therefore any attack on the dopamine hypothesis is a bit of a straw man, assuming that the 
intended purpose was to criticise neuroscience accounts of addiction more broadly. A recent and 
concise overview of the neurobiology of addiction is provided by Volkow et al. (2016)1, and the 
current paper might be strengthened by broadening the coverage of neuroscientific accounts of 
addiction. The paper would also be strengthened by referring to other reviews which demonstrate 
that neuroscience research more broadly has failed to deliver novel effective treatments for 
addiction, and this might be partly because of its inability to model the complexity of addiction, 
including the importance of social factors (Field & Kersbergen, 2020; Heilig et al.,2016 ; Borsboom 
et al 2020)2-4, the latter includes a relevant commentary by Field et al. (p18) that discusses the 
opioid crisis and “deaths of despair” in the context of reductionist neuroscience approaches to 
addiction). 
 
2. Alternatively, perhaps the focus on the dopamine hypothesis was because it has 
 
“proven highly influential in shaping perceptions of addiction neuroscience in the social sciences 
(Courtwright, 2019). It is how, with few exceptions, social scientists conceive of addiction neuroscience” 
(p6). 
 
If so, the purpose of the criticism of the dopamine hypothesis might be signposted more clearly, 
along the lines of “the neuroscience has moved on, and it is important that social scientists catch 
up”. 
 
3. The line of argument in the paper then moves on to argue for the importance of “the memory 
turn” as a potentially important way to conceive of addiction and to bridge neuroscience with 
social science. I broadly agree. However, the evidence presented in favour of the notion that a 
focus on memory may yield new treatments for addiction is selective and rose-tinted. The recent 
work by Marsden and colleagues on MCFT is preliminary and has not yet been subjected to a 
definitive clinical trial, therefore the findings from small pilot studies should be interpreted with 
caution. The authors should also consider other translational addiction interventions that aimed to 
disrupt drug-related memories, and generally did not translate well “from bench to bedside” (e.g. 
Das & Kamboj)5. More recent memory-focussed interventions have also yielded promising 
findings (e.g. Das et al., 2019)6. These findings might be discussed. However in the absence of 
well-powered trials, the clinical promise of interventions translated from “the memory turn” 
should not be overstated. 
 
4. In my opinion the most significant limitation of the paper is its central argument, summarized 
on p8:  
 
“the memory turn is thus much better suited to interrogating the more destructive cases of substance 
addiction that represent the opioid crisis. It is more attuned to the lived experience of human addiction 
as shown in social and clinical studies referred to above. It taps into the complex nature of motivation in 
which pleasure and pain coexist in drug memory. It is not simply that the person wishes to ‘feel good’, or 
to be ‘free of pain’, it is that pleasure and pain become entwined in reinforcing ways. And it does so, by 
situating the neural, cognitive and affective systems involved within a neuropsychological schema in 
which the social’ plays a decisive role”. 
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Where is the supportive evidence for this grand claim? I think that “the social and clinical studies 
referred to above”, refers to the literature discussed on p5-6 which demonstrate that opioids 
function as negative reinforcers (they relieve physical and emotional pain in addition to producing 
euphoria). The notion that negative reinforcement underpins addiction has a long history and 
indeed the underpinning neuroscience is well described in work by Koob and colleagues, as cited 
here. It is also plausible that negative reinforcement models of addiction can account for “deaths 
of despair”, including the opioid crisis. But why does this suggest that memory-based treatment 
interventions are likely to provide the answer? This link was not clear to me, and the paper would 
be greatly improved if the authors could spell out the relevant evidence and its implications more 
clearly. In addition, alternative explanations of the link between social deprivation and drug 
addiction should be considered, including relative absence of alternative (substance free) 
reinforcement (e.g. Leventhal et al., 2015; Acuff et al., 2019)7,8. 
  
5. The authors made other claims that were not clearly supported by the evidence, for example on 
p8: 
  
 “These relations represent a challenge for addiction research: the need to develop conceptual and 
experimental models of the ways that unconscious and conscious processes interact through memory to 
undermine human efforts to develop new relationships (cognitive and affective) with drugs”. 
  
6. Also, I would agree with the following claim, as many would, but I did not understand how this 
claim is related to the “memory turn”, or how it follows from the arguments presented (p8): 
  
“…harm reduction activism (see Campbell, 2020) that is led by service users, but supported by 
neurosocial collaborations, would be a positive move forward.” 
  
7. The authors claim that “The compulsive, chronic, relapsing hallmarks of substance addiction can 
be explained through neurochemical maladaptations alone”. Although this is certainly the 
conventional view among addiction neuroscientists, the notion of addiction as a chronically 
relapsing disorder of compulsion has been challenged in recent years (e.g. Heather, 2017)9, and 
this debate should be mentioned here. 
 
8. Throughout the paper and particularly on page 7, the authors place technical terms from the 
neuroscience and memory literatures in quotation marks (e.g. “corticostriatal systems”, 
“declarative”). I’m not sure what the quotation marks are supposed to achieve here – it would be 
better to define the terms in a way that would be useful for the intended audience of this paper. 
 
9. On page 7 authors state that “powerful memories” are part of one of the diagnostic criteria in 
DSM 5. I’m not sure that this is correct. The authors include a footnote in relation to this claim but 
I could not see the footnote anywhere. 
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